In his recent book 'Moral Skepticisms' Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. In this paper I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Second, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? And, finally, how can he account for basic features of moral agency? It turns out that the last problem is the most serious one for his account.
There is a lot to think and talk about in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's brilliant and original book. 2 I would like to raise three questions here: whether there are constraints on admissible contrast classes (I), whether contrastivism can accommodate a certain indeterminacy of relevant reference classes (II), and how contrastivism can account for 1 This article has been published in The Philosophical Quarterly 58, 2008, 463-470 What determines the craziness or adequacy of a moral contrast class? Certainly not (simply) practical purposes like in (at least some) non-moral cases: not even the practical purposes of the thirsty guy. His practical purposes may determine which contrast class is relevant when it comes to prudential judgments. However, moral judgments are different: They are certainly less "pragmatic" and more "absolute". There is a moral value at stake here: the value of the survival of the thirsty guy. This value "forces" us to include certain options in our contrast class, like the option of offering him sparkling water. It is not clear whether moral contrastivism can accommodate this idea. In both moral and non-moral cases the class of admissible contrast classes is thus restricted: In non-moral cases by pragmatic purposes (and perhaps some other factors) and in moral cases by moral values. All this adds a further dimension to Sinnott-Armstrong's contrastivism.
One might wonder whether contrastivism applies to that dimension of constraints, too. There could be contrast classes of constraints for contrast classes. That someone is justified in believing a particular constraint to be the appropriate one would have to be understood in the following way: The subject is justified out of a given contrast class of constraints for contrast classes to believe that a particular constraint is the appropriate one. Apart from first-order contrast classes which do not have constraints for contrast classes amongst their members we would also have to deal with second-order contrast classes which do have constraints for first-order contrast classes amongst their members. More generally, contrast classes of the n+1th (for n>0) order would have constraints for contrast classes of the nth order amongst their members.
Tempting as it might seem to discuss the intricacies of higher-order constraints, I won't go into that here.
To come back to the main point here: The introduction of values won't make the contrastivism Sinnott-Armstrong is talking about go away. There can be more than one value at stake and all those values might conflict with each other; contrastivism may offer insights in such cases. We might be justified in going with one value -out of a particular contrast class of conflicting values. Apart from that and more importantly:
Even given one and only one value that is at stake, there is still variation between contrast classes. Is my belief that I ought to give the guy some sparkling water justified (II) A is driving in his car at 20 mph in the densely populated X-neighbourhood.
Suddenly a kid appears out of the blue and runs onto the street. A cannot avoid to hit and kill the child.
Again, something terrible has happened. A was not drunk. However, it is obvious that there are many kindergartens and schools in this neighbourhood, including warning signs. There is a high chance in this neighbourhood that kids suddenly run onto the street. A knows all this. We want to say something like the following: He should have driven more carefully. A has made a moral mistake and everyone would criticize him morally. A cannot claim to suffer from bad luck, especially moral bad luck. Case (2) is a case of morally bad behaviour whereas (1) isn't and just involves bad luck (perhaps even moral bad luck).
The question I want to raise is a very simple one: What if case I = case II? What if Z-street is located in the X-neighbourhood? According to what I have said so far, the agent seems to both deserve and not deserve blame. But this is a contraction. What is the way out of this problem?
I cannot go into the details here but here is a very short and sketchy answer.
Judgments about moral responsibility like the ones just mentioned can apparently (in some cases) be relative to underlying (spatial, etc.) reference classes (street vs.
neighbourhood, for instance). Given the long history of failed attempts to solve the reference class problem in probability theory 10 and to show what determines the relevant reference class, we have good reasons to assume either that all this is beyond our cognitive reach or that there simply is no such thing as the one relevant reference class. In both cases, we should accept the conclusion that some of our moral judgments have to be relativized to "pickings" of reference classes. It is us who pick reference classes. This need not be arbitrary but will usually reflect practical interests, values, beliefs, etc. Some of our moral judgments seem to reflect particular perspectives which are defined by such attitudes and lead to the selection of particular reference classes.
Hence, I'd propose to add a second aspect of relativization: not just to contrast classes but also to different kinds of reference classes in the sense explained above. This obviously has serious implications for our conception of moral judgment and its objectivity even if this indeterminacy is restricted to certain cases and certain kinds of reference classes. The question whether an agent like A deserves or does not deserve blame for his action does not always seem to allow for just one answer. It all depends on the reference class. Given one reference class, our driver in the example above is to blame, according to another reference class he isn't. Given the reference class chosen by the prosecution in court, he might be to blame; given the reference class chosen by the defence in court, he might not be to blame. This seems to be a huge problem for any moral theory which does not claim to be sceptical without any restriction (remember that Sinnott-Armstrong wants to be a moderate sceptic, not a radical sceptic). Either the contrastivist wants to be able to say, as contrastivist, that Ann ought to help that person. But then the contrastivist lacks the resources to defend that answer. Or the contrastivist does not want to be able to recommend helping behaviour to Ann. This would be in line with contrastivist theory but would certainly conflict with a strong intuition many people have: namely that Ann should help that person (and perhaps not even think about it much). This leads back to section 1 above about constraints on contrast classes: There are moral values which impose constraints on admissible contrast classes. Moral contrastivism seems caught in a dilemma: Either it is more sceptical in practical respects than it is supposed to be (second horn) or it does not have the resources to avoid the collapse into straightforward scepticism when it comes to action (first horn).
Here is a slightly different version of the same basic problem. The problem is that the contrastivist does not seem to have the resources to say that this kind of ignorance is or can be (moral) bliss.
The root of both versions of our problem lies in the "absoluteness" moral action requires, -an absoluteness which is in tension with contrastivist relativization. The question is, more generally: How can contrastivists be moral agents and how can they account for moral agency?
IV. LEFT OUTS
One could also raise questions concerning closure of knowledge or justification under known entailment (or under justified belief in such entailment). I won't go into that here; Jonathan Schaffer has something on offer for contrastivists. 13 Another issue one might have in mind as a problem is cross context talk. H, with his more demanding 13 See J. Schaffer, 'Closure, Contrast, and Answer, Philosophical Studies, 133 (2007), pp. 233-255. standards, denies that Mary has a justified moral belief that feeding the hungry is obligatory whereas L, with his more relaxed standards, asserts that Mary's belief is justified. Both H and L might be right, given that they have different contrast classes in mind. Suppose H is a contrastivist who accepts that L is right to attribute a justified belief to Mary. How can he do that if he, H, holds that Mary doesn't have a justified belief? Relativization to contrast classes will do the trick here but I won't go into the details. 14 I just mention these two problems in order to signal that the kinds of objections typically made against contextualism or SSI do not seem to work against contrastivism. It would be much more interesting to see what Sinnott-Armstrong thinks about the three problems discussed above. 15
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